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This paper introduces a class of stochastic hybrid models for the analysis of closedloop control systems implemented with NASA’s Recoverable Computer System. Such
Recoverable Computer Systems have been proposed to insure reliable control performance
in harsh environments. The stochastic hybrid models consist of either a stochastic finitestate automaton or a finite-state machine driven by a Markov input, which in turn drives
a switched linear discrete-time dynamical system. Their stability and output tracking
performance are analyzed using an extension of the existing theory for Markov jump-linear
systems. For illustration, a stochastic hybrid model is used to calculate the tracking error
performance of a Boeing 737 at cruising altitude and in closed-loop with a Recoverable
Computer System subject to neutron-induced single-event upsets. The upsets are modeled
with a Markov process. The results are validated using experimental data obtained from
a simulated neutron environment in NASA’s SAFETI Laboratory.

I.

Introduction

hen cosmic rays collide with oxygen and nitrogen atoms in the earth’s upper atmosphere, free neutrons
W
are produced with energies varying from 10 MeV to 1 GeV.
The higher the altitude, the higher the
neutron flux and energy. When a neutron passes through a solid state device, it has been observed that
1, 2

3

stored electric charge can be locally redistributed, which may cause a single-event effect (SEE). If this charge
resides in a solid state memory device, for example a computer’s cache memory, a binary “one” can be flipped
to a “zero” or vice versa. It is also possible for dielectric material in the device to rupture and create short
circuits, which can burn out neighboring devices if sufficient electric potential exists.4, 5 Normally, the errors
due to SEE’s are classified into two categories: soft errors and hard errors.6, 7 Soft errors by their nature are
nondestructive to the hardware but alter memory contents and/or computer logic. Their effects are usually
transient, but may require the hardware to be reset or refreshed. Hard errors, on the other hand, may be
destructive. Chip burnouts cause permanent malfunctioning of the hardware. Another hard error is latchup,
which is a potentially destructive short-circuit that can be corrected by resetting the hardware. Single event
upsets (SEU’s) are defined as soft errors, induced by radiation, that produce a malfunction at some level in
the system, which is usually transient and nondestructive to the hardware. However, if a sequence of bit
errors is not detected and corrected, it can cause system errors and reduce closed-loop performance. The
phenomenon has been studied extensively at the component level by semiconductor manufacturers.4, 8, 9 In
this context, both analytical models and data are available to provide SEU probability estimates under a
wide variety of circumstances. In contrast, at the system level, the problem has not received much attention.
In Refs. 10, 11, the effect of upsets on system stability was studied for a few fault-tolerant architectures.
However, at present no performance analysis studies are available.
As more commercial aircraft control systems and avionics are implemented using embedded digital hardware, SEU’s have recently come to the attention of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a potential
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safety hazard. In response, a program has been developed with the general goal of quantifying the nature
of the risk and to produce guidelines for the aerospace industry and chip manufacturers. As part of this
program, the authors in cooperation with the NASA Langley Research Center are investigating the effects
of atmospheric neutrons on commercial and experimental flight control hardware in closed-loop with aircraft
simulation software. A set of experiments is underway at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) in Los Alamos, New Mexico to provide data. While a variety of different technologies will be tested,
the focus here is on an experimental Recoverable Computer System (RCS) developed by Honeywell, Inc.
The error recovery system in this prototype is implew (k)
mented using dual-lock-step processors together with new
fault tolerant architectures and communication subsys- r (k) +
y (k)
Aircraft
+ +
D/A
A/D
tems.12, 13 It has most recently been used to study recov_
Dynamics
ery from transient faults introduced by high intensity electromagnetic radiation.14, 15 The error recovery technique
Recoverable System
implemented on the RCS is a variation of rollback recov0
0
Nominal
ery;16, 17 it has the following steps: checkpointing, faultController
yc (k)
tolerant comparison, rollback, and retry. During a check1
1
Upset
point, the state of each microprocessor module is stored.
Controller
When an upset is detected, rollback of both microprocessor modules to a previous checkpoint takes place, and then
θ (k)
the system is allowed to proceed with normal execution.
Recovery
But once the execution of the normal control program is
Logic
interrupted, the execution of a different control law takes
ν (k)
place, one that has significantly different dynamics and is
on a time scale that can alter the overall closed-loop dyUpset
Generator
namics of the flight control system. These characteristics
of the recoverable system can be modeled as a two-mode
switched system. If there is no upset detected, the system Figure 1. A conceptual closed-loop flight conis operating in its nominal mode. When the controller is trol system with a recoverable flight control computer.
executing a rollback recovery, the system is performing in
its recovery mode. A conceptual diagram of the RCS in a
closed-loop configuration is shown in Fig. 1.
The FAA/NASA research program is centered around the analysis of experimental data collected from
a series of experiments conducted at LANSCE. A conceptual diagram of the testbed is shown in Fig. 2.
A beam of free neutrons is directed through a flux sensor at the device under test, in this case a flight
control computer. The energy spectrum of the neutron
Flight Control
Barrier
source is shown in Fig. 3. Its shape is very similar to
Flux Sensor
Computer
Beam Source
that produced by atmospheric neutrons, but the flux is
five to six orders of magnitude higher. The flight control computer in this setup runs a control program which
processes outputs from a Boeing 737 flight simulation system running on a separate host computer. The flight control computer generates the appropriate control signals
to the aircraft simulation model for maintaining straight
and level flight at a cruising altitude of 34,000 feet. This
interconnection between the flight control computer and
the flight simulation host computer constitutes a closedData Acquisition
Flight Simulation
loop feedback control system, which is the unique feaHost Computer
Host Computer
ture of these experiments. Under nominal conditions,
i.e., no neutrons, this system regulates the aircraft head- Figure 2. The testbed for the LANSCE experiing and orientation very well, even under considerable ments.
winds and gusts which can be introduced into the simulation model. The data acquisition system is maintained on a third computer system. It collects
the flight data from the simulation as well as the measurements from the flux sensor for off-line analysis. Should the aircraft deviate from the nominal flight path at any time, it will be possible to determine the total radiation dose the flight control computer received up to that instant. When neutrons

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...................
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collide with the flight control computer, the specific effects of any disturbance will depend on the particular nature of the control computer’s internal hardware and any fault-tolerant features it possesses.
The main goal of this paper is to model and predict the
10
output tracking error produced by neutron induced SEU’s.
Experimental Neutron Flux at LANSCE
To this end, a class of stochastic hybrid models is introduced to describe recoverable flight control systems. Both
10
stochastic finite-state automata (SFSA’s) and finite-state
machines (FSM’s) are used to model the recovery process
10
of the RCS. In each case, the mean-square stability and
output tracking performance of the hybrid model class are
10
analyzed. The model is validated in a controlled exper5
iment at NASA’s SAFETI Laboratory, where computer
Normalized Atmospheric Neutron Flux (Multiplied by 2.62×10 )
upsets are injected into the RCS at a specified rate, and
5
2
10
Integrated Neutron Flux Above 1 MeV is 4.18×10 n/cm /sec
the effects on the output tracking performance of the simulated aircraft are directly observed and quantified. The
10
output performance is compared with the theoretical pre10
10
10
10
Neutron Energy
(MeV)
dictions using the SFSA and FSM models. A separate
publication will address the model’s performance against
Figure 3. The neutron energy spectrum at LANthe LANSCE data. Since the LANSCE neutron source SCE in December, 2002.
is much more intense than normal atmospheric sources,
the final application of these models will be to rescale the
performance predictions made using the LANSCE data to fit aircraft flying in normal operating conditions.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III provide the main theoretical background. Section II
describes the general class of stochastic hybrid models. Section III provides the mathematical tools for
analyzing the stability and output performance of these hybrid models. Sections IV and V employ these tools
to analyze a recoverable flight control system. Specifically, Section IV describes how to model a Boeing 737
system in closed-loop with an RCS. Section V provides the stability and output performance predictions of
the flight control system when subject to SEU’s. Section VI describes the validation of the model using data
obtained from the simulated-neutron environment at NASA Langley. Section VII summarizes the conclusions
and plans for future research.
The mathematical notation used throughout this paper is largely consistent with Ref. 18. Random
variables are denoted in bold italic fonts. The symbol Z+ denotes the set of all non-negative integers. N is
the set of all natural numbers. Rn is the n-dimensional real vector space, and M(Rn ) is the normed linear
space of all n × n real matrices. The subset of all symmetric positive semi-definite matrices is M(Rn )+ .
HnN = {V = (V1 , V2 , . . . , VN ) : Vi ∈ M(Rn )} will be used to denote the space of all N -tuples of n × n real
matrices. If every Vi of a given V in HnN is positive definite or positive semi-definite, this is indicated,
n
n
respectively, by V > 0 and V ≥ 0. Hn+
N denotes the set {V ∈ HN : V ≥ 0}. Given U, V ∈ HN , the inner
n
product on HN is defined by
N
X

tr UiT Vi ,
hU, V i =
5

Neutron Intensity
2
(n/MeV/cm /sec)

4

3

2
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and kV k = hV, V i is the induced norm squared of V . (k · k will also be used for representing the standard
norm on Rn .) B (HnN ) is the space of all bounded linear operators on HnN under the induced operator norm
kL(V )k
,
V 6=0 kV k

kLk = sup

where L ∈ B (HnN ). rσ (L) is used to denote the spectral radius of L, specifically, rσ (L) = limk→∞ Lk
k ∈ Z+ .

II.

1
k

for

Stochastic Hybrid Models for Recoverable Closed-Loop Systems

class of stochastic hybrid models for an aircraft in closed-loop with an RCS is shown in Fig. 4. It
consists of a stochastic hybrid system driven by an SFSA with a Markov input process. Similar to
A
electromagnetic radiation induced upsets (see Ref. 10), the neutron induced upset process can be modeled
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as a two-state Markov chain. The SFSA models the rollback recovery process. The switched system models
the dynamics of the closed-loop due to the presence of controller recoveries. If the switching process θ(k)
is a Markov chain, then the system’s mean-square stability and output performance can be analyzed using
existing methods (for example, see Refs. 19, 20). However, in most cases, the output process of an SFSA is
not Markovian. The goal of this section is to describe a related process which is Markov.
In the present context, an SFSA is defined as folθ (k)
Stochastic
lows.21, 22, 23
y (k)
ν (k)
Markov
Switched
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Process

Finite-State

System

Automaton
Definition 1 (SFSA). Let (Ω, F, Pr) represent the amUpset Generator
Recovery Logic
Closed-Loop System
bient probability space. A stochastic finite-state auw (k)
tomaton A is a six-tuple, (ΣI , ΣS , ΣO , [0, 1], f, g), where
ΣI = {η1 , η2 , . . . , ηM } is the set of input symbols; ΣS = Figure 4. The stochastic hybrid model consisting
{ζ1 , ζ2 , . . . , ζN } denotes the set of internal states; and of a switched system driven by an SFSA.
ΣO = {ξ1 , ξ2 , . . . , ξP } is the set of output symbols. Let
ν(k), z(k), and θ(k) denote the input random process,
the state process, and the output process of the automaton, respectively, where k ∈ Z+ . f describes the
dynamics of the state transition relation:

f : (ΣS , ΣI , ΣS ) → [0, 1]


(ζj , ηl , ζi ) 7→ Pr z(k + 1) = ζj | ν(k) = ηl , z(k) = ζi := [Πηl ]ζi ζj ,

which is the ζi ζj -th component of the state transition matrix Πηl for the input symbol ηl . For fixed i ∈
PN
{1, 2, . . . , N } and l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }, j=1 [Πηl ]ζi ζj = 1. The output relation g is described by
g : (ΣO , ΣI , ΣS ) → [0, 1]


(ξt , ηr , ζs ) 7→ Pr θ(k) = ξt | ν(k) = ηr , z(k) = ζs := [Φηr ]ζs ξt ,

where for given s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } and r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }, 0 ≤

PP

t=1

[Φηr ]ζs ξt ≤ 1.

Definition 2 (FSM). For an SFSA, if both [Πηl ]ζi ζj and [Φηr ]ζs ξt only assume values 0 or 1 for all ηl , ηr ∈
ΣI , ζi , ζj , ζs ∈ ΣS and ξt ∈ ΣO , then the automaton is called a finite-state machine, and is denoted by the
six-tuple M = (ΣI , ΣS , ΣO , {0, 1} , f, g).
Therefore, an FSM is simply a special case of an SFSA. In the current application, it is always assumed
that the output is isomorphic to the state of an SFSA with probability one, that is, P ≡ N and g (ξt , ηr , ζs ) =
1{s=t} for all input symbols ηr ∈ ΣI , where 1{s=t} is the Dirac measure. The following theorem describes an
input-output cross chain process generated by an SFSA with a Markov input. The special case for FSM’s
appears in Refs. 24, 25 and the references therein. A similar idea (without proof) also appears in Ref. 26
for random dynamical systems with jumps. A more general Feller-Markov property is proved in Ref. 27 for
continuous-time stochastic systems.
Theorem 1. If the input process ν(k) of an N -state SFSA A is an M -state Markov chain with probability
transition matrix ΠI , which is independent of the initial state of the automaton,
z(0), then the Cartesian

product of the input and output processes of the SFSA, ρ(k) := ν(k), θ(k) , is an M N -state Markov chain
with state transition matrix
ΠI/O = diag (Πη1 , Πη2 , . . . , ΠηM ) · (ΠI ⊗ IN ) .

(1)

(Here IN denotes an N × N identity matrix.)
Proof. Only an outline is given here. The complete
in Ref. 28. For 
any k ∈ Z+ , let for exam- 
 proof is available

ple {ν(k)} represent the event {ν(k) = ν(k)} and ν(k), z(k) represent the event ν(k), z(k) = ν(k), z(k) .
Consider an arbitrary event of the form




F (k) := ν(k), z(k) , ν(k − 1), z(k − 1) , . . . , ν(0), z(0) .
4 of 13
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When k ≥ 2, from the assumptions that ν is Markov and independent of z(0), it follows that
Pr {F (k)} =

k−1
Yh

Πν(i)

i=0

=

k−1
Yh

Πν(i)

i=0

i

z(i)z(i+1)

i

z(i)z(i+1)

i
h
= Πν(k−1)

z(k−1)z(k)

i
h
= Πν(k−1)
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z(k−1)z(k)

i
h
= Πν(k−1)

z(k−1)z(k)

Pr {ν(k), ν(k − 1), . . . , ν(0), z(0)}

Pr {ν(k) | ν(k − 1), . . . , ν(0)} Pr {ν(k − 1), . . . , ν(0), z(0)}
k−2
Yh

Πν(i)

i=0

i

z(i)z(i+1)

[ΠI ]ν(k−1)ν(k)

k−2
Yh

Pr {ν(k) | ν(k−1)} Pr {ν(k−1), . . . , ν(0), z(0)}

Πν(i)

i=0

i

z(i)z(i+1)

Pr {ν(k − 1), . . . , ν(0), z(0)}

[ΠI ]ν(k−1)ν(k) Pr {F (k − 1)} .

Therefore,
Pr



h
i

ν(k), z(k) | F (k − 1) = Πν(k−1)

z(k−1)z(k)

[ΠI ]ν(k−1)ν(k) .

(2)

Applying Lemma 16 in Ref. 28 (with r = 1) gives

Pr {ν(k) | ν(k − 1), z(k − 1)} = Pr {ν(k) | ν(k − 1)} ,

k ≥ 1.

Thus,


ν(k), z(k) , ν(k − 1), z(k − 1)
i
h
Pr {ν(k), ν(k − 1), z(k − 1)}
= Πν(k−1)
z(k−1)z(k)
i
h
= Πν(k−1)
Pr {ν(k) | ν(k − 1), z(k − 1)} Pr {ν(k − 1), z(k − 1)}
z(k−1)z(k)
i
h
Pr {ν(k) | ν(k − 1)} Pr {ν(k − 1), z(k − 1)}
= Πν(k−1)
z(k−1)z(k)
h
i


= Πν(k−1)
[ΠI ]ν(k−1)ν(k) Pr ν(k − 1), z(k − 1) .

Pr



z(k−1)z(k)

Consequently,

Pr



i
h


ν(k), z(k) | ν(k − 1), z(k − 1) = Πν(k−1)

z(k−1)z(k)

[ΠI ]ν(k−1)ν(k) .

Comparing Eqs. (2) and (3), it is clear that





Pr ν(k), z(k) | F (k − 1) = Pr ν(k), z(k) | ν(k − 1), z(k − 1) ,

(3)

which implies that the input-state cross process (ν, z) is Markov. From the assumption that the output
process is isomorphic to the state process of the SFSA with probability one, it is immediate that ρ = (ν, θ)
is also Markov with the transition probability



Pr ν(k) = ηt , θ(k) = ξj | ν(k − 1) = ηs , θ(k − 1) = ξi = [ΠI ]ηs ηt [Πηs ]ξi ξj .

The matrix of transition probabilities [ΠI ]ηs ηt [Πηs ]ξi ξj for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N and s, t = 1, 2, . . . , M is

ΠI/O



[ΠI ]η1 η1 Πη1

..
=
.

[ΠI ]ηM η1 ΠηM

···
···


[ΠI ]η1 ηM Πη1

..
 = diag (Πη1 , Πη2 , . . . , ΠηM ) · (ΠI ⊗ IN ) ,
.

ηM
[ΠI ]ηM ηM Π

which concludes the proof of the theorem.
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III.

Stability and Performance Analysis of Stochastic Hybrid Systems

the nth-order stochastic hybrid system in Fig. 4 with p output signals given by the state space
Consider
model
x(k + 1) =Aθ(k) x(k) + Gθ(k) w(k),
y(k) =Cθ(k) x(k),

x(0) = x0 , θ(0) = θ 0

(4a)
(4b)

where θ(k) is a stochastic switching signal produced by the SFSA. Here w(k) is a zero-mean, white noise
process with covariance matrix Im . In general θ(k) is not necessarily Markov, so letting ρ(k) be the Cartesian
product of the input and output processes of the SFSA (see Fig. 5), the analysis can be performed using the
nth-order Markov jump-linear system

Downloaded by OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY on December 4, 2019 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.2005-6430

x(k + 1) =Ãρ(k) x(k) + G̃ρ(k) w(k),

x(0) = x0 , ρ(0) = ρ0

(5a)

y(k) =C̃ρ(k) x(k),

(5b)

which is equivalent to system (4) in the following sense.
Definition 3 (Model Equivalence). The stochastic hybrid system (4) and the Markov jump-linear system (5)
are said to be model-equivalent if Ãρ(k) := Ã(ν(k),θ(k)) ≡ Aθ(k) , G̃ρ(k) := G̃(ν(k),θ(k)) ≡ Gθ(k) and C̃ρ(k) :=
C̃(ν(k),θ(k)) ≡ Cθ(k) for k ∈ Z+ .
From the definition, the following result is
immediate.
Lemma 1. When systems (4) and (5) are
model-equivalent, they have the same state
process x(k) and the same output process y(k)
for k ∈ Z+ .
This concept is employed in the following subsection to perform stability and performance analysis of system (4).
A.

Markov
Process
Upset
Generator

ν (k)

Stochastic
Finite-State
Automaton

ρ (k)

(ν, θ)
θ (k)

Recovery
Logic

Cartesian
Product

Markov
Jump-Linear
System

y (k)

Closed-Loop
System

w (k)

Figure 5. The equivalent Markov jump-linear model for a
stochastic hybrid system driven by an SFSA.

Mean-Square Stability of a Stochastic Hybrid System

The stability definition for a stochastic hybrid system used throughout is given below.
Definition n
4 (Mean-Square
Stability). A stochastic hybrid system (4) with w(k) = 0 is mean-square stable
o
2
(MSS) if E kx(k)k → 0 as k → ∞ for any initial condition x0 with a finite second-order moment and
any initial distributions for ν 0 and θ 0 .
Mean-square stability of the equivalent system (5) can be determined using standard stability results
for Markov jump-linear systems (see Ref. 18). For i = 1, 2, . . . , M and j = 1, 2, . . . , N , let l = (i −
1)N + j and µl := (ηi , ξj ). The symbol set {µl : l = 1, 2, . . . , M N } labels the elements in ΣI × ΣO . Let
T
linear operators E(·) =
C̄ = C̄µ1 , C̄µ2 , . . . , C̄µM N ∈ Hn+
M N be an M N -tuple with C̄µl = C̃µl C̃µl . The


n
Eµ1 (·), Eµ2 (·), . . . , EµM N (·) ∈ B (HM N ) and L(·) = Lµ1 (·), Lµ2 (·), . . . , LµM N (·) ∈ B (HnM N ) are defined

PM N 
T
as Eµl (C̄) =
q=1 ΠI/O µl µq C̄µq and Lµl (C̄) = Aµl Eµl (C̄)Aµl , respecL
tively. The operator L has the matrix representation
S −−−−→ L(S)
x
x





ϕy ϕ−1
ϕ−1  yϕ
A2 := diag ÃT ⊗ ÃT , ÃT ⊗ ÃT , . . . , ÃT
ΠI/O ⊗ In2
⊗ ÃT
µ1

µ1

µ2

µ2

µM N

µM N

A

(see Fig. 6). From this representation and the results in Ref. 18, the following
stability theorem is evident.

Theorem 2. The following statements regarding system (5) are equivalent:
(a) The Markov jump-linear system is MSS;
6 of 13
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2
→ ϕ(L(S))
ϕ(S) −−−−

Figure 6. The relationship between L and A2 . Here S ∈
Hn+
M N and ϕ denotes the column stacking operator.

(b) rσ (L) < 1;
(c) rσ (A2 ) < 1.
From Lemma 1, the following result provides a stability test for the stochastic hybrid system (4).
Lemma 2. A stochastic hybrid system (4) is MSS if and only if the model-equivalent Markov jump-linear
system (5) is MSS.
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B.

Output Performance of a Stochastic Hybrid Model

For an MSS Markov jump-linear system (5), the output performance measure J is defined below:

n
o
J0 := E P∞ ky(k)k2
: w(k) ≡ 0
k=0
o
n
J=
2
Jw := limk→∞ E ky(k)k
: w(k) 6≡ 0,

where J0 is the mean output energy, and Jw is the mean output power. The goal of this section is to produce
explicit analytical expressions for J via a generalization of the observability Gramian described in Refs. 18,29.
This expression for Jw can be shown to be similar to the output’s power semi-norm developed in Ref. 30 for
network controlled systems with data dropouts when both G̃ and C̃ in system (5) are not switched.
Suppose that ρ(k) has a stationary distribution, and ρs is a random variable with this distribution. Then
πI/O (µl ) := Pr {ρs = µl } for l = 1, 2, . . . , M N is determined by solving the eigen-equation




πI/O (µ1 )
πI/O (µ1 )




 πI/O (µ2 ) 
 πI/O (µ2 ) 
T
.



..
..

 = ΠI/O 





.
.
πI/O (µM N )
πI/O (µM N )
The following theorem is a variation of Proposition 8 in Ref. 19.

Theorem
3. For an MSS Markov jump-linear system (5), where ρ(k) is aperiodic and ergodic, let Q̄µi (k) :=

E x(k)xT (k)1{ρ(k)=µi } for any k ∈ Z+ and Q̄µi := limk→∞ Q̄µi (k). If x0 , w, and ρ are independent then



T −1
2 − A
)
,
,
.
.
.
,
V
,
V
ϕ
(V
I
Q̄µi = ϕ−1
µ
µ
µ
M
N
n
2
µi
MN
2
1
where Vµj :=


PM N 
i=1 ΠI/O µ

i µj

Gµi GT
µi πI/O (µi ).

Corollary 1. For an MSS Markov jump-linear system (5), where ρ(k) is aperiodic and ergodic, if x0 = 0,
and w and ρ are independent then


M
N
X


(6)
Jw = tr 
C̄µj Q̄µj  .
j=1

+

Proof. For any k ∈ Z ,


Jw = lim E y T (k)y(k)
k→∞
n 
o
T
= lim E tr C̃ρ(k)
C̃ρ(k) x(k)xT (k)
k→∞


M
N n
o
X
= lim tr 
E C̃µTj C̃µj x(k)xT (k)1{ρ(k)=µj } 
k→∞



= tr 


which completes the proof.

= tr 

M
N
X
j=1

M
N
X
j=1

j=1



C̄µj · lim E x(k)xT (k)1{ρ(k)=µj }


k→∞





C̄µj Q̄µj  ,
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This corollary and the following lemma are used to produce the main performance theorem.
Lemma 3. For an MSS Markov jump-linear system (5), given any P = (P1 , P2 , . . . , PM N ) ∈ HnM N :
(a) if w = 0, and for any k ∈ Z+ x0 and ρ(k) are independent, then


E xT (k + 1)Pρ(k+1) x(k + 1) = E xT (k)Lρ(k) (P )x(k) ;
(b) if x0 = 0, and for any k ∈ Z+ w(k) and ρ(k) are independent, then

o
n 


P
G̃
.
E xT (k + 1)Pρ(k+1) x(k + 1) = E xT (k)Lρ(k) (P )x(k) + E tr G̃T
ρ(k) ρ(k+1) ρ(k)
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Proof. See Ref. 31.

The main results concerning output performance are given next. Specifically, it is shown that J0 and Jw
can be concisely written in terms of generalized observability Gramians.
Theorem 4. Consider an MSS Markov jump-linear system (5), where ρ(k) is aperiodic and ergodic.
(a) If w = 0, and x0 and ρ are independent, then the mean output energy is
( "∞
# )
X
T
k
J0 = E x0
Lρ0 (C̄) x0 = tr(X0 Q0 ),
k=0

o
nP

∞
k
k
where X0 := E x0 xT
0 , Q0 := E
k=0 Lρ0 (C̄) , and L denotes the composition of L k times with

L0 (C̄) := C̄.

(b) If x0 , w and ρ are independent, then the mean output power is
(
!)
k−1
i
o
 n
Xh
i
Jw = lim E tr
G̃T
,
= tr E Ḡρs Q̃ρs
ρ(k−i−1) Lρ(k−i) (C̄)G̃ρ(k−i−1)
k→∞

where Ḡρs := G̃ρs G̃T
ρs and Q̃ρs := Eρs
Proof. See Refs. 31, 32.

(7)

i=0

P∞

k=0


Lk (C̄) .

From Lemma 1, the following result concerning output performance of the stochastic hybrid system (4)
is easily verified.
Lemma 4. The output performance metrics J0 and Jw of the stochastic hybrid system (4) are equivalent to
that of the model-equivalent Markov jump-linear system (5).
The next sections demonstrate how to apply the stability and performance tools developed in this section
to analyze the output tracking performance of an aircraft with a recoverable flight control system.

IV.

Modeling an Aircraft System in Closed-Loop with an RCS

n this section, models for a Boeing 737 flight control system in closed-loop with an RCS are developed.
Isystem.
These mathematical models are used in the subsequent section to analyze the tracking performance of the
A.

System Identification of the Boeing 737 Simulation Model with an RCS

The first step in the model building process was to identify two state space models for a Boeing 737 in level
flight: one for the nominal mode Σn : (An , Gn , Cn ) and one for all the recovery modes Σr : (Ari , Gri , Cri ),
i = 1, 2, . . . , 6, simply denoted as Σr : (Ar , Gr , Cr ). I/O data was collected for identification using the
nonlinear Boeing 737 Simulink model described in Ref. 33. The control characteristics of the RCS are
discussed in Refs. 14,15. The only “inputs” in this case are the noise signals, which are used in the Simulink
code to drive the Dryden wind gust model. The output signal was chosen to be the altitude of the aircraft.
8 of 13
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The function pem from MATLAB’s System Identification Toolbox was used for identifying the models.
Seventeen sets of data containing 2, 000 samples each were used for building the nominal model, and another
35 sets of data were used to verify the model. The identified model for the nominal mode Σn was an eighthorder system. Since the recovery mode is usually unstable, it was assumed that the system normally operates
in this mode for a short period of time. Therefore, 190 data sets with only 200 samples per set were used
for identification. Another 35 sets were used for verification. The identified model of the recovery mode Σr
was sixth-order.
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B.

The Switched System

It is only possible to switch between Σn and Σr if their respective state space coordinate systems are the same.
But here not even their dimensions are equivalent. To remedy the situation, Σr was embedded into an eighthorder system in such a way that the new system, Σ̂r , had the same controllability indices as Σn , specifically,
{3, 3, 2}. Therefore, each system can be transformed to the same Brunovsky form,34 and the switching
can be done (formally) by switching between state space
Tn
gain matrices, K̂n and K̂r , and input transformation ma- { An , Gn , Cn }
{ Aˆn , Gˆ n , Cˆn }
trices, L̂n and L̂r . Specifically, Fig. 7 shows how the
( Kˆ n , Lˆn )
Brunovsky canonical form acts as a “bridge” between
the controller canonical forms of the two modes. Σn
Brunovsky
A , G  , {Cˆ n , Cˆ r }
is transformed into its controller canonical form Σ̂n by
Canonical
± K̂
Form
Tn . Σr is transformed
into its controller canonical form

_
_
_
_
( Kˆ r , Lˆr )
Σr : Ar , Gr , Cr by Tr . Then two stable states are

{

added to Σ̄r to produce an eighth-order system Σ̂r . Now
Σ̂n and Σ̂r can be transformed
to the

 same
 Brunovsky

◦
◦
canonical form (A , G ) by K̂n , L̂n and K̂r , L̂r , re◦

spectively, since A = Ân − Ĝn L̂n K̂n = Âr − Ĝr L̂r K̂r and
G◦ = Ĝn L̂n = Ĝr L̂r . The switching between Σ̂n and Σ̂r
can be done using K̂ := K̂n − K̂r , L̂n and L̂r , because
Ân = Âr + G◦ K̂ and Ĝn = Ĝr L̂r L̂−1
n .
C.

{ Ar , Gr , Cr }

Tr

{A , G , C }


r





r

r

}

State Space
Embedding

{ Aˆ , Gˆ , Cˆ }
r

r

r

Figure 7. The Brunovsky canonical form acts as
a “bridge” between the state space models for the
two system modes Σn and Σr .

Rollback Recovery Modeling

The rollback recovery process can be modeled in a variety of ways. The most accurate approach models the
actual freezing of the control signals, the rolling back of the control data, the logic of the recovery process, and
the delay introduced into the feedback loop. Such an approach is described in Refs. 11, 35 for the simplified
longitudinal dynamics of the F-16. The complexity of the Boeing 737 nonlinear simulation model in Ref. 33
required that a much simpler approach be taken: only the rollback recovery delay was modeled using either
an FSM or an SFSA. Experiments showed that approximately 80% of the recovery periods of the RCS
were six frames in length (1 frame = 0.05 sec) and 20% were five
{0, 1}
frames. Any request for a recovery during an active recovery process
R
R
was ignored. This information was encoded into an FSM by assum{0, 1}
{1}
ing that all the recovery periods were six frames. For better accuracy,
an SFSA was also designed to match the recovery length probability
R
distribution. The corresponding FSM M = (ΣI , ΣS , ΣO , {0, 1}, f, g)
N
{0, 1}
and SFSA A = (ΣI , ΣS , ΣO , [0, 1], f, g) are shown in Figs. 8 and 9, {0}
respectively. The input process to the FSM/SFSA is a homogeneous,
R
two-state, first-order Markov chain. The probability transition matrix
of the Markov chain is ΠI . The set of states for the Markov chain is
{0, 1}
{0, 1}
R
R
ΣI = {0, 1}, where “0” indicates that no upset was detected and “1” in{0, 1}
dicates that an upset has been detected. The FSM/SFSA symbol sets
are ΣS = {N, R1 , . . . , R6 } and ΣO = {n, r1 , . . . , r6 }. f is defined by
Figure 8. The FSM used to model
Π0 and Π1 , and g is a state-to-output isomorphism. The FSM/SFSA the rollback recovery process of the
produces at its output the random signal θ(k), which switches between RCS.
the symbols “n” and “ri ”, i = 1, 2, . . . , 6 representing the “nominal”
mode and the “recovery” modes, respectively.
1

2

3

4

6
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5

1.00

1.00
1.00

R1

1.00

R2

R1

R2

1.00
R3

{0}
1.00

R6

R5

1.00

N

R4

0.20

1.00

R3

{1}

1.00

N

R4

0.20

1.00

1.00

0.80

R6

R5

1.00

0.80

(a) The state transition diagram for input symbol “0”, which specifies Π0 .

(b) The state transition diagram for input symbol “1”, which specifies Π1 .

V.

Tracking Performance Analysis of the Boeing 737 Flight System

etting the reference input r(k) ≡ 0, the nominal (unswitched) system compared against the system with
Srecoveries
gives rise to an output tracking error described by the following state space model:
xe (k + 1) = Ae,θ(k) xe (k) + Ge,θ(k) w(k),
y e (k) = Ce,θ(k) xe (k),

xe (0) = xe,0 , θ(0) = θ 0

(8a)
(8b)

h
iT
iT

h

T
T
where xe (k) = x̂T (k) x̂T
,
G
=
and Ce,θ(k) =
,
A
=
diag
Â
,
Â
Ĝ
Ĝ
(k)
n
e,θ(k)
e,θ(k)
θ(k)
n
n
θ(k)
i
h
Ĉθ(k) −Ĉn . x̂(k) and x̂n (k) are the state vectors of the switched and nominal closed-loop systems; w(k)
is a zero-mean white noise process used to generate a wind input; and y e (k) is the closed-loop output tracking
error. The models Σ̂n and Σ̂r described in Subsection IV-B were used to build the 16th-order system (8).
The Markov cross chain process ρ(k) has transition probability matrix

ΠI/O = diag Π0 , Π1 · (ΠI ⊗ I7 ) .


Setting ΠI = 1−[Π1 I ]01 [ΠI0]01 , where parameter [ΠI ]01 is the probability of an upset, Fig. 10 shows rσ (A2 )
1.12

1.005

Finite−State Machine
Stochastic Finite−State Automaton

Finite−State Machine
Stochastic Finite−State Automaton

1.1

2

Spectral radius of script A2’s

1

Spectral radius of script A ’s
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Figure 9. The SFSA used to model the rollback recovery process of the RCS.

1.08

1.06

1.04

1.02

Stability Threshold

0.995

0.99

0.985

1

0.98
0

Stability Threshold

0.2

0.4
0.6
Upset probability

0.8

1

(a) [ΠI ]01 ∈ [0, 1].

0.98
0

0.5

1
Upset probability

1.5

2
−3

x 10

(b) [ΠI ]01 ∈ [0, 0.002].

Figure 10. rσ (A2 ) as a function of upset probability for the SFSA stochastic hybrid model and the FSM hybrid
dynamical model.

plotted as a function of [ΠI ]01 . The SFSA stochastic hybrid model is MSS when [ΠI ]01 < 0.0016, which is a
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slightly higher stability boundary than that predicted by the FSM hybrid model. When the system is MSS,
the predicted mean output tracking error power, Jw , is shown in Fig. 11 for each model. As it might be
expected, the higher the upset probability, the larger the output tracking error power. In addition, the error
power is unbounded at the stability boundary.
40
Prediction from an FSM
Prediction from an SFSA
Experimental Cluster Mean

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0

0.1

0.4

0.6
Upset probability

0.9

1.2
−3

x 10

Figure 11. The SFSA/FSM-predicted mean output tracking error powers as a function of upset
probability and the experimental results for six
specific upset probabilities.

VI.

Figure 12. The RCS experimental environment in the
SAFETI Laboratory at NASA Langley.

Model Validation Using the NASA Experimental Data

series of experiments was conducted in a simulated neutron environment at the NASA Langley Research
A
Center’s SAFETI Laboratory. Fig. 12 shows the experimental testbed and the RCS developed by Honeywell. The RCS flight control system was connected in closed-loop with a Boeing 737 flight simulation system
running on a separate host computer. The input reference signals were set to maintain straight and level
flight at a cruising altitude of 34, 000 feet. A data acquisition system was maintained on a third computer
system. It collected flight data during the simulation. Neutron interactions were simulated by triggering
rollback recoveries according to a pre-determined Markov upset process while the aircraft flew in 1 ft/sec
(light) winds. High wind conditions were not tested since they can excite nonlinear modes in the aircraft
dynamics, which are not modeled in the present jump-linear framework. Data was collected for 60 one-hour
(real time) flights.
Ten sets of experimental data were collected for each
140
of the following six upset probabilities [ΠI ]01 : 0, 0.0001,
0.0004, 0.0006, 0.0009, and 0.0012. In each case, dif120
ferent sample functions from the corresponding Markov
process ν(k) were used to supply the RCS with a series
100
of recovery requests for the closed-loop system. The ten
80
experimental output tracking error powers for each value
of [ΠI ]01 are shown in Fig. 13. Cluster analysis, a tool for
60
analyzing under sampled data sets, was used to exclude
36
the outliers for each probability. Specifically, as shown
40
in Fig. 14, hierarchical clustering diagrams were used
based on the Euclidean distances between the measured
20
output powers. The dashed lines denote experimental
data which was discarded because it was far away from
0
0 0.1
0.4
0.6
0.9
1.2
−3
Upset probability
the main clusters (indicated in solid lines). Here the
x 10
one or two highest links were removed if they were approximately four times higher than the other links. The Figure 13. The distribution of ten output tracking
average output tracking error powers for the six proba- error powers for six specific upset probabilities.
Ten experimental output tracking error powers (ft 2)
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bilities were computed empirically from the experimental output data within the main cluster. The results
are shown in Fig. 11 and compared against the theoretical predictions using both the SFSA and the FSM.
The SFSA prediction is superior, as it is slightly closer to the experimental curve.
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(a) [ΠI ]01 = 0.

8
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4

(e) [ΠI ]01 = 0.0009.
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0

3
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7

(f) [ΠI ]01 = 0.0012.

Figure 14. The cluster analysis diagrams for six specific upset probabilities.

VII.

Conclusions

n this paper, a class of stochastic hybrid models was introduced for modeling recoverable closed-loop
Imodel-equivalent
systems subject to Markovian upset processes. A mean-square stability criteria was developed using a
Markov jump-linear system. Output performance was characterized in terms of a new
generalized observability Gramian. The model was then applied to a Boeing 737 in closed-loop with an
RCS subject to neutron induced SEU’s. Performance predictions were validated using data from a simulated
neutron environment at NASA Langley. In the future, these analysis tools will be used to rescale performance
estimates derived from real (accelerated) neutron tests conducted at Los Alamos. This will allow the FAA
to assess any potential safety hazards due to SEU’s for aircraft flying under normal atmospheric conditions.
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